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IN THE SUPP.EME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
KARL J. STAVAR, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 15432 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMEllT 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S FOINT I 
THE STATE HAS STANDING TO APPEAL IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE Atl ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC OFFICIAL IS NOT A 
"CRIMINAL ACTION. II 
State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 
(1961) (hereinafter Geurts) is dispositive of this issue. 
That case involved an appeal from a final judgment in a 
removal proceeding brought under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 
et seq (1953), and this Court stated that "This proceeding 
can properly be regarded as quasi-criminal." (Emphasis 
added). 11 Utah 2d at 350, 359 P.2d at 16. In discussing 
the applicability of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the removal proceeding, this Court held that "This pro-
ceeding can be nothing other than a ~pecial statutory 
proceeding. (~mphasis added), 11 Utah at 350, 359 P.~ 
at 17, and held that Rule Bl(a) governed the action, rat~r 
than Rule 81 (e), which would apply if the removal proceeding 
were a "criminal proceeding." 
This Court's decision in Geurts, that an action to 
remove a public officer is not a criminal action, is consiste: 
with the legislature's intent. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14 
(1953) demonstrates that the legislature intended appeals 
from judgnent in removal actions to be civil in nature where 
it provides, "From a judgment of removal an appeal may be 
taken to the Supreme Court in the same manner as from a judg-
ment in a civil action. " (Emphasis added). Even the 
criminal code clearly states that removal from office is a 
civil matter. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2) (Supp. 1977) 
declares: "This chapter shall not deprive a court of authori: 
conferred by law to . .permit removal of a person from 
office .•. or impose any other civil penalty." 
In an earlier case, Skeen v. Craig, 31 Utah 20, 86 
Pac. 487 (1906), this Court aligned itself with what it 
termed "the great weight of authority"· and "the better reasoni 
-2-
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cases," in expressly holding that judicial proceedings for 
removal of officers were civil in nature. Id. 86 Pac. at 
488. The Court considered the kind of judgment which may 
result as dispositive, and finding that no fine or imprison-
ment could be imposed declared the removal proceeding civil 
in nature. 
The Guerts conclusion is also consistent with the 
fundamental right of appellate review guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution. Article VIII, Section 9 of our constitution 
provides, "From all final judgments of the district court there 
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court." In State 
v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 91, 59 P. 553, 554 (1899),this Court 
interpreted that constitutional provision as: 
" ... a plain and express provision 
of the fundamental law which grants the 
right of appeal 'from all final judgments 
of the district courts.' It is mandatory 
and applies alike to criminal prosecutions 
and civil actions. .The State is not 
made an exception •. ·" (Emphasis added,) 
Respondent hopes to deny the State its right of 
appeal in this action by citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4 
(1953). The scope of that statute is limited, ~owever, by 
Utah Code Ann § 77-39-1 (1953~ which provides, "Either party 
in a criminal action m~y .•. appeal to the Supreme Court as 
-3-
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prescribed in this chapter." (Emphasis added.) The State 
submits that § 77-39-4, by its very terms, applies only~ 
criminal actions and that a resoval proceeding is not a 
criminal action as has been shown above. 
The Geurts conclusion is also consistent with the I 
laws .of other jurisdictions which hold that a proceeding to 
remove a public officer is not criminal in nature. §_h~ 
v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, 448 P.2d 301 
(Okla. Jud. 1968) cert. denied 394 U.S. 904; I~eiser v. Bel: 
332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Penn. 1971); McComb v. Commission 
on Judicial Conduct, 138 Cal.Rpt:i: 459, 564 P.2d 1 ( 1977): I 
Archbold v. Huntingdon, 34 Idaho 558, 0201 Pac. 1041 (1921). 
Appellant submits that a reraoval proceeding is r.c: 
a criminal action, and that § 77-39-4 is not applicable. 
-4-
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Respondent seeks to apply Section 77-39-4 to 
a non-criminal action by relying on Hartman v. Weggeland, 
19 Utah 2d 229, 429 P. 2d 978 (1957) (hereinafter Hartr.lan). 
Appellant submits that Hartman is of limited precedential 
value, and, assuming it is a viable precedent, is inapplicable 
to the case at bar. First, in Hartman the State sought to 
appeal an order of a district court that compelled discovery 
in a criminal action (i.e., an action to prosecute a criminal 
offense defined by Title 76 of the Utah Code, to which 
criminal penalties attach). Hartman is therefore distin-
guishable from the case at bar, which is an appeal from a 
final judgment in a non-criminal removal proceeding. Second, 
the Hartman decision appears not to have been followed by 
this Court. In Van Darn v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977) 
(hereinafter Van Darn), this Court allowed the State to appeal 
a district court's dismissal of a petition for a writ of 
mandamus that arose from the erroneous dismissal of a 
criminal action. The Van Darn case appears consistent with 
the line of cases which allow the State to appeal in non-
criminal actions which arise directly from criminal actions. 
See, e.g., Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 Pac. 988 (1908), 
-5-
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holding that the State may appeal from a judgment in a 
habeas corpus action which collaterally attacks a criminal 
judgment. Appellant submits that Hartman has not been 
followed by this Court, and is inapplicable to the case 
at bar. 
There is a potent policy consideration which 
supports granting the State a right of review in this case. 
If corruption in a county or district were to spread so as 
to include judicial as well as other public officers, a 
corrupt judge could protect his corrupt confederates by 
dismissing any accusation brought against them. If the 
judge's dismissal is unappealable, the corrupt county syster 
could become self-perpetuating. Appeal is the only satis-
factory remedy, and the only satisfactory "correction of 
any despotic or arbitrary dismissal of a case by a judge." 
State v. Davenport, 30 Utah 2d 298, 300, 517 P.2d 544, 546 
(1973) (Crockett, J. dissenting). Appellant urges this 
Court to hold Section 77-39-4 inapplicable to removal 
proceedings in order to protect the integrity of government. 
One other consideration could make removal based 
upon a criminal conviction impossible if the court held 
-6-
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removal proceedings to be criminal. Presently a person 
may be removed for conviction of certain crimes {as well 
as for malfeasance) according to removal statutes. !f 
removal is criminal, and a removal is attempted, based 
upon a conviction and not upon malfeasance in office, then 
the double jeopardy clause of the Utah State Constitution 
would come into play, barring the second criminal action 
(removal) against a defendant for the same conduct arising 
out of a single criminal episode. Removal based upon a 
conviction might well be impossible iE removal is criminal. 
This double jeopardy problem is one of the precise reasons 
many courts have held removal proceedings not criminal. 
Thurston v. Clark, 107 Cal. 285, 40 Pac. 435 (1895). Accord, 
Skeen v. Paine, 32 Utah 295, 90 Pac. 440 (1907); Law v. 
Smith, 34 Utah 394, 98 Pac. 300 (1908). 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II AND AJltICUS CURIAE 
A co:NVICTION FOR A CRIME IS NOT A PRE,REQUISITE 
TO INITIATION OF AN ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC OFFICIAL, 
ESPECIALLY \vHEN REMOVAL IS BASED UPON MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE. 
The earlier pre-1967 removal statute was interpreted 
by this Court in State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 
571 (1965), as requiring misconduct "in office" for removal 
and leaving an official, guilty of crimes outside of office, 
inunune from removal. Thus, county auditor Jones who failed 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to file an income tax return while in office, was a pparent: I 
sent to prison (see Representative Frost below) and yet I 
was held not subject to the removal action. Responding i 
to this decision, Representative Frost of the Utah State ' 
Legislature submitted a legislative amendment to the 1967 l 
I 
Legislature to "strengthen" this law. Referring to j 
Respondent's exhibit, Transcript of Debate for Third 
Reading House Bill No. 82: 
"REPRESENTATIVE FROST: • • • I 
would like to give you just a little 
bit of background on this bill. It 
came about through the --incident here 
in Salt Lake County of Mr. Jones being 
convicted and being sent to prison 
while in office, and so I decided 
that probably there was something that 
needed to be done about the bill. I 
read in the paper where the governor 
and other officials said that the law 
was not clear on cases like this and 
that it should be cleared up, so I 
asked, first before the session started, 
I asked Mr. Lewis Lloyd from the 
Legislative Council to research this 
up a bit. I didn't ask him to prepare 
a bill, but I asked his opinion on it 
and he said yes, he concurred that the 
law needed to be cleared up and 
strengthened. When the session started 
he did have a bill prepared for me on 
this. • • I we.nt down to the Attorney 
General's Office with it, and I also 
asked that the reference if thev thought 
that this law should be strenghened and 
cleared up and thev said yes, very 
definitely. They had the opinion.also 
that there should be a strengthening· 
-8-
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in this field, the law should be 
clarified and strengthened." 
Floor Debate on House Bill 82, 
February 2, 1967. 
Respondent admits that Representative Frost 
sought to strengthen the removal statute to correct the 
problem that arose because of State v. Jones, supra. To 
strengthen the law does not mean to narrow the scope and 
effect of the statute. In this case, it appears 
Representative Frost wanted to broaden the removal 
statute. In other words, Representative Frost apparently 
wanted to make an official who had committed wrongdoing 
outside of office subject to removal as well as one who 
had committed wrongdoing in office. 
If respondent's interpretation of the removal 
statute is followed, this intent to broaden the removal laws 
and to create more responsibility in public office would be 
thwarted. If a public official must be convicted of a 
crime before removal, then public officials who are not 
performing their duties may well be immune from removal. 
For example, the offense of official misconduct, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-201 (1953), as amended, requires a specific 
intent that the public official in his misconduct or 
misfeasance have the intent "[t]o benefit himself or 
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another or to harm another .• If the nublic 
official totally neglects his lawful duties and if he 
does not act with the motive of benefitting himself or 
another, he cannot be convicted, hence not removed from 
office. If he is corrupt for corruption sake and not 
for benefit he is free so to be, and the public is 
without protection. Such a result is not "strengthening" 
the law of malfeasance, but miserably emascultating it. 
Such a result flies in the face of the legislative in~~. 
Even if some other statute might allow removal 
of the corrupt officer by some other public officials 
(such as a county commission) if those other officials 
fail to act, the public has no protection, no speedy 
removal. 
Provisions in state constitutions and in 
state statutes relating to the removal of public officials 
are intended to provide a speedy remedy for the removal 
of corrupt and unfaithful officials. State v. Scarth, 
151 Okl. 178, 3 P.2d 446 (1931); Com. ex rel. Davis v. 
Malbon, 195 Va. 368, 78 S.E. 2d 683 (1953). The reason for 
such provisions is based on public policy: specifically, 
they are intended to protect the public interest. 
-10-
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The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Geurts, 
supra, emphasized the underlying reasons for the expedi-
tious nature of removal proceedings: 
"From a survey of the chapter 
(77-7 U.C.A. 1953) it appears that 
the legislature thought the interests 
of the public in combating corruption 
in public office require an expeditious 
procedure for the removal of pUblic 
officers who betray their trusts. 
Quite likely this is the reason why 
no provision is made therein for a 
preliminary hearing as is done for 
felonies in the criminal code. 
The need for reasonable expedi-
tion and the elimination of obstructing 
or delaying tactics cannot be ignored." 
Id., 359 P.2d at 16. 
Requiring now, not only a possible preliminary 
hearing, but a trial and a sentence, before proceedings 
could be initiated and a trial held for removal, does 
not comport with this intent and public interest. 
Respondent places great weight on the statements 
of two legislators in 1967. However, it should be noted 
that one of the two felt or desired that a person not be 
removed unless a conviction for a felony prece~ed removal. 
Representative Frost stated that "they have to be convicted 
of a felony to begin with •••• " Respondent's Brief at 
page 9. Obviously and gratefully his desires in that 
regard were not followed by the legislature. 
-11-
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I 
' 
" i 
When the criminal code was changed in 1973, 
the legislature chose not to repeal the words "malfeasance 
in office" in Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1953), as amended, 
even though a crime labelled "malfeasance in office" was 
to be repealed. Such action shows that the legislature 
desired to allow removal for malfeasance in office even 
though conviction for some crime so named would be impossibt 
This later expression of legislative intent clearly shows 
that respondent's analysis of the earlier, 1967, intent of 
the legislature is either false, or superseded as of 1973, 
Respondent requests this Court to assume that the 
legislature did not know what it was doing when it failed 
to repeal the words "malfeasance in office" in Section 77-7· 
The assumption that a legislative body did not know what 
they were doing is one of the most disfavored doctrines of 
law. The legislature should be presumed to be acting 
responsibly and knowingly. 
Great weight is given by respondent to have proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt before any removal. This Court 
in State v. Geurts, supra, and State v. Jones, supra, 
concluded the removal proceedings would require a burden of 
proof as in a criminal action. Thus, the burden of proofu 
the protection to the public official is supplied by the 
removal proceeding itself. 
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REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSATION 
TOTALLY DEFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO SET FORTH FACTS WITH 
SUFFICIEUT PARTICULARITY TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Respondent relies almost exclusively on Burke v. 
Knox, 59 Utah 596, 206 Pac. 711 (1922), which has been 
superseded by the entire later body of law regarding 
pleading and practice with respect to accusations. See, 
for example, the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-11-1, 77-21-6, 77-21-7, and 77-21-8 (1953), as amended, 
which statutes the State of Utah has relied upon in its 
original brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The State of Utah may appeal from the dismissal of 
the action to remove respondent from off ice because removal 
is not a criminal action. The legislature does not require 
a conviction to precede the initiation of a proceeding to 
remove. To hold otherwise would be to presume that the 
legislature used words and phrases inadvisedly, and desired 
to emasculate the law of removal. Pleading in this matter 
was correct under currently applicable laws regarding accusations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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